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Suit Seeking Right to Worship in Gyanvapi Mosque is Maintainable

On 12.09.2022, DJ, Varanasi, Dr. Ajay Krishna Vishvesha in Original Suit No. 18 of 2022 titled Smt. Rakhi Singh & Ors. Vs. State of UP & Ors. delivered an order disposing of the application filed under O7R11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’), wherein, the application under O7R11 of the CPC was filed by Defendant No. 4 on the following grounds-

  1. The Suit of the Plaintiffs is barred by Section 4 of the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1991’).

  2. The Suit of the Plaintiffs is barred by Section 85 of the Waqf Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1995’).

  3. The Suit of the Plaintiffs is barred by the Uttar Pradesh Shri Kashi Vishwanath Temple Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of 1983’).


Scope of Court’s Power Under O7R11, CPC 

It is a settled principle of law that while deciding an application under O7R11 of the CPC, only the averments of the Plaint must be seen and the defence made in the Suit must not be considered. However, if the Suit does not disclose a right to sue, the Plaint can be rejected under O7R11, CPC

(Authorities - Urvashiben & anr. v. Krishnakant Manuprasad Trivedi 2019 All. C.J. 445, Saleem Bhai Vs. State of Maharashtra 2003(1) SCC 557, Kuldeep Singh Pathania Vs. Bikram Singh Jaryal 2017(5) SCC 347, Shaukathussain Mohammed Patel Vs. Khatunben Mohmmedbhai Polara 2019 (10) SCC 226, Srihari Hanumandas Totala Vs. Hemant Vithal Kamat 2021 SCC Online SC 565, M/s Kisan Rice Mill Karhal District Mainpuri and Ors. vs. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti and Ors.,(Allahabad High Court), P. V. Gururaj Reddy & Anr. Vs. P. Neeradha Reddy & Ors. 2015(1) SCC 331, Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Owners & Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express & Ors. 2006(3) SCC 100, Kamala & Ors. Vs. K.T. Eshwara Sa & Ors. 2008(12) SCC 661, T. Arivandandam vs T. V. Satyapal & Anr. 1977 (4) SCC 467, M/s Frost International Ltd. v. M/s Milan Developers and Builder Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. 2022 All. C.J. 1102 and D Ramchandran v. R. V. Janki Raman 1999 (3) SCC 367).


Whether the Suit of the Plaintiffs is barred by Section 4 of the Act of 1991:-

From the averments made in the Plaint, it is clear that the Plaintiffs are claiming that till the year 1993, they were allowed to have Darshan and Pooja of Maa Sringar Gauri daily which exists within the property in question at the backside of Gyanvapi in the northeast corner but thereafter the District Administration, Varanasi restricted their entry within the disputed property on all days and they were being allowed to worship within old temple only on 4th day of Chaitra in Vashantik Navaratra. Therefore, according to the Plaintiffs, even after 15th August 1947 they were worshiping Maa Sringar Gauri, Lord Ganesh, and Lord Hanuman daily up to the year 1993. If this contention is proved then the Suit is not barred by Section 4 of the Act of 1991. At this stage, the averments made in the Plaint are to be seen and Plaintiffs will have the right to prove their averments by cogent evidence.


Right to Worship and Jurisdiction of Civil Courts

Ugam Singh v. Kesari Mal 1970 (3) SCC 831 - A Right to Worship is a civil right, interference with which raises a dispute of civil nature though as noticed earlier disputes which are in respect of rituals or ceremonies alone cannot be adjudicated by Civil Courts if they are not essentially connected with civil rights of an individual or a sect on behalf of whom a suit is filed. 

P.M.A. Metropolitan & Ors. v. Moran Mar Marthoma & Anr. 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 286 - The Civil Courts have jurisdiction to entertain the Suits for violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 25 & 26 of the Constitution of India and the expression of civil nature used in Section 9 is wider than even civil proceedings and thus extends to such religious matters which have civil consequence.

Ram Jankijee Deities & Ors vs State Of Bihar And Ors 1999 (5) SCC 50 -  To constitute a temple it is enough if it is a place of public religious worship and if the people believe in its religious efficacy irrespective of the fact whether there is an idol or a structure or other paraphernalia. It is enough if the devotees or the pilgrims feel that there is some superhuman power that they should worship and invoke its blessings. 

M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das (2020) 1 SCC 266 (Ram Janam Bhumi Temple) - Legal personality is not conferred on the Supreme Being. The Supreme Being has no physical presence for it is understood to be omnipresent on the very ground of being itself. The court does not confer legal personality on divinity. Divinity in Hindu philosophy is seamless, universal, and infinite. Divinity pervades every aspect of the universe. The attributes of divinity defy description and furnish the fundamental basis for not defining it with reference to boundaries physical or legal. For the reason that it is omnipresent, it would be impossible to distinguish where one legal entity ends and the next begins. The narrow confines of the law are ill-suited to engage in such an exercise and it is for this reason, that the law has steered clear from adopting this approach. In Hinduism, physical manifestations of the Supreme Being exist in the form of idols to allow worshippers to experience a shapeless being. The idol is a representation of the Supreme Being. The idol, by possessing a physical form is identifiable.


Therefore, in the light of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, it is clear that the right to worship is a civil right and any interference in it will raise a dispute of civil nature and under Section 9 of CPC, Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide such case involving such a dispute. In the present case, the Plaintiffs are demanding the right to worship Maa Sringar Gauri, Lord Ganesh, and Lord Hanuman at the disputed property, therefore, Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Further, according to the pleadings of the Plaintiffs, they were worshipping Maa Sringar Gauri, Lord Hanuman, and Lord Ganesh at the disputed place incessantly for a long time till 1993. After 1993, they were allowed to worship the above-mentioned Gods only once a year under the regulatory of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Thus, according to plaintiffs, they worshipped Maa Sringar Gauri, Lord Hanuman at the disputed place regularly even after 15th August 1947. Therefore, The Act of 1991 does not operate as a bar on the suit of the Plaintiffs, and the suit of Plaintiffs is not barred by Section 9 of the Act.


Whether the Suit of the Plaintiffs is barred by Section 85 of the Act of 1995

In the present case, the Plaintiffs have claimed relief that they should be allowed to worship the deities of Maa Sringar Gauri and other Gods and Goddesses in the disputed property but such relief is not covered under Sections 33, 35, 47, 48, 51, 54, 61, 64, 67, 72, & 73 of the Act of 1995. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the present suit is not barred. Therefore, the bar under Section 85 of the Act of 1995 does not operate in the present case because the Plaintiffs are non-Muslims and strangers to the alleged Waqf created at the disputed property and relief claimed in the suit is not covered under Sections 33, 35, 47, 48, 51, 54, 61, 64, 67, 72 & 73 of the Waqf Act. Hence, the suit of the plaintiffs is not barred by Section 85 of the Act of 1995


Whether the Suit of the Plaintiffs is barred by the Act of 1983 -

Section 5 of the Act of 1983 declares that the ownership of the temple and its endowment shall vest in the deity of Shri Kashi Vishwanath. 

Section 6 of the Act of 1983 provides that with effect from the appointed date, the administration and governance of the Temple and its endowments shall vest in a Board to be called the Board of Trustees for Shri Kashi Vishwanath Temple. 

In Section 4 (5) endowment includes all properties, movable or immovable, belonging to or given or endowed for the support or maintenance or improvement of the Temple or for the performance of any worship, service, ritual, ceremony, or other religious observance in the Temple or any charity connected therewith and includes the idols installed therein, the premises of the Temple and gifts of property made or intend to be made for the Temple or the deities installed therein to anyone within the precincts of the Temple. 

In Section 4 (9), "Temple" has been defined as the Temple of Adi Visheshwar, popularly known as Sri Kashi Vishwanath Temple, situated in the City of Varanasi which is used as a place of public religious worship, and dedicated to or for the benefit of or used as of right by the Hindus, as a place of public religious worship of the Jyotirlinga and includes all subordinate temple, shrines, sub-shrines and the Asthan of all other images and deities, mandaps, wells, tanks, and other necessary structures and land appurtenant thereto and additions which may be made thereto after the appointed date. 

From the perusal of the above-mentioned provisions of the Act, it is clear that no bar has been imposed by the Act regarding a suit claiming the right to worship idols installed in the endowment within the premises of the temple, or outside. 



Blog on the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 https://legallysane00.blogspot.com/2022/05/places-of-worship-act-not-applicable-to.html

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