Skip to main content

Places of Worship Act Not Applicable to Krishna Janmbhoomi Case - Mathura Court

There is no prima facie irregularity in the judgment pronounced by the DJ, Mathura if the 1968 agreement is genuine and does not violate the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 or any other relevant provisions of law, time being in force, and most importantly, after the said agreement, one Consent Decree (Compromise Decree) was also passed in 1974 which makes the agreement valid and binding unless otherwise decided by the Court of Justice.

Further, the effect of this judgment does not render the Act of 1991 a nugatory rather it substantiates the validity of the said Act. In pursuance of learning this aspect, we need to understand the basics of the Act of 1991.


It prohibits two things-

  1. Firstly, the conversion of any place of worship of any religious denomination or any section thereof into a place of worship of a DIFFERENT SECTION of the SAME RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION (it means the temple of one deity cannot be converted into the temple of another deity of same religious denomination).


  1. Secondly, the conversion of any place of worship of any religious denomination or any section thereof into a place of worship of a DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION or any section thereof (it means the temple of one deity cannot be converted into a place of worship of another deity of different religious denomination)


This Act contains a positive presumption of conclusive proof to maintain the religious character of a place of worship existing on the 15th August 1947 for effecting the prohibition imposed on the abovementioned two things stating “shall continue to be the same as it existed on that day”.

With the enactment of this Act, three possible situations arise-

  1. A dispute between two classes with respect to the conversion of the religious character of a place of worship which was never taken to a Court of Justice before the commencement of the Act of 1991.

  2. A dispute between two classes with respect to the conversion of the religious character of a place of worship which was taken to a Court of Justice before the commencement of the Act of 1991 and remained pending at the time of commencement of this Act. 

  3. A dispute between two classes with respect to the conversion of the religious character of a place of worship which was taken to a Court of Justice before the commencement of the Act of 1991 and was finally decided, settled, or disposed of before the commencement of this Act.


First Situation - With regard to this situation, the Act bars the institution of any future suit, appeal, or other proceeding but it does not bar such institution if the suit, appeal, or other proceedings are instituted on the ground that conversion has taken place after the 15th August 1947 and it shall be decided in accordance with the presumption of conclusive proof to maintain the religious character of a place of worship existing on the 15th August 1947.


Second Situation - With regard to this situation, the Act says any suit, appeal, or other proceeding shall abate and also bars subsequent institution of any suit, appeal, or other proceeding with respect to the same on and after the commencement of the Act of 1991. It further says that if any suit, appeal, or other proceeding is instituted on the ground that conversion has taken place after 15th August 1947 shall not abate and be decided by the Court of Justice in accordance with the presumption of conclusive proof to maintain the religious character of a place of worship existing on the 15th August 1947. 


Third Situation - With regard to this situation, the Act says it shall not apply to such a situation therefore the decision of the Court of Justice shall operate without any interference and shall remain unaffected by this Act. It shall equally cover the settlement reached by the parties amongst themselves outside the Court of Justice and therefore operate as per the terms and conditions of the settlement agreement.


The present case falls within the ambit of the third situation and therefore shall be squarely covered by it. The DJ, Mathura has correctly observed in his judgment that since the dispute has already been settled between the parties in 1968 and it resulted in a Consent Decree (Compromise Decree) in 1974 therefore the Act of 1991 cannot interfere with the application of the said decree as it is expressly provided by the Act of 1991 itself and the said decree shall operate above anything, i.e if the said Decree is set aside by the Court of Justice on the ground of an invalid settlement agreement, the Act of 1991 shall become operational in the present case, resultantly, the matter shall then be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1991.  

In the judgment itself, it has been mentioned that “with regard to the entire property of Katra Keshav Deo, whether Shri Krishna Janma Bhoomi Seva Sangh had the power to enter into a compromise with Trust Masjid Eidgah is a matter of evidence that can be determined only on the basis of the evidence adduced by both the parties during the trial.”


This opinion does not cause harm, to any extent, to the application or legality of the Act of 1991 and it does not exceed the limitations imposed by the Act, therefore, cannot be termed as contrary to the intention of the legislature, in fact, expresses the true intention of the legislature.


Note - The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 is being referred to as “Act of 1991”


Comments

Popular posts from this blog

All Cases of Sexual Intercourse Based on a False Promise of Marriage NOT Covered under Section 69 of the BNS

Recently, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered against Yash Dayal, a Royal Challengers Bangalore (RCB) player, under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) for engaging in sexual intercourse on the false pretext of marriage. The complainant alleged that, relying on Yash Dayal’s false promise of marriage, she consented to sexual intercourse. Notably, the FIR was not registered under Section 64 (rape) of the BNS. This raises the question: Are all cases of sexual intercourse based on a false promise of marriage (vitiated consent) now exclusively covered under Section 69 of the BNS? Prior to the enactment of the BNS, sexual intercourse induced by a false promise of marriage was punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and classified as rape. This classification stemmed from Section 375 of the IPC, which defines rape as, inter alia, sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, and Section 90, which states that consent given under a misconceptio...

Requirements for Criminal Liability under Sections 406 and 420 IPC

The Supreme Court of India’s judgment in Ashok Kumar Jain v. The State of Gujarat and Another (2025 INSC 614), delivered on May 1, 2025, is a significant exposition on the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), to quash a First Information Report (FIR) in cases where allegations of criminal breach of trust and cheating under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) are deemed to be a misuse of criminal process for civil disputes. The judgment meticulously analyzes the alleged offenses' legal ingredients, the commercial transaction's factual matrix, and the documentary evidence, ultimately concluding that the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process. Factual Background The case arises from a commercial transaction between the appellant, Ashok Kumar Jain, a director of Maayu Import and Export Ltd., a Sri Lankan company, and the second respondent, a proprietor of Ansh Prints, a textile business in Surat, Gujara...

Advocates Vs. CAs/CSs/CMAs

This article deals with the exclusive right to practise law and tribunal representation and the principles relating to a Harmonious Construction of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Companies Act, 2013 Introduction  The ongoing controversy concerning the right of non-advocate professionals, namely Chartered Accountants(CAs), Company Secretaries(CSs), and Cost and Management Accountants(CMAs), to appear and argue matters before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) raises fundamental questions touching the statutory monopoly over the practice of law in India. This post examines the competing statutory claims under the Advocates Act, 1961 and Section 432 of the Companies Act, 2013, applies the doctrine of harmonious construction, and concludes that Section 432 does not, and constitutionally cannot, confer any independent or parallel right to practise law upon non-advocates before tribunals. Background of the Dispute Recently, t...