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Reinforcing Constitutional Boundaries: A Critical Ananlysis of the State of TN Vs Governor of TN

The SCI’s judgment authored by Justice JB Pardiwala in the State of Tamil Nadu Vs the Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr., delivered on April 8, 2025 is a landmark decision that addresses critical constitutional questions regarding the role of the governor under Article 200 of the Constitution, particularly in relation to the assent to bills passed by the State Legislature. The case arose from disputes between the State of Tamil Nadu and its Governor over delays and actions concerning legislative bills, prosecution sanctions, prisoner releases, and appointments to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC). The judgment provides a comprehensive interpretation of the Governor’s powers, establishes timelines for action, and reinforces principles of parliamentary democracy, federalism, and judicial review. Below is a detailed analysis of the judgment’s contents, structured around its key sections and findings.       


1. Factual Matrix

The factual background of the case revolves around multiple grievances raised by the State of Tamil Nadu against the Governor’s actions or inactions in five key areas:


A. Assent to Bills

a. Context: Between January 13, 2020, and April 28, 2023, the Tamil Nadu State Legislature passed 12 bills and forwarded them to the Governor for assent under Article 200. The Governor, who assumed office on November 18, 2021, did not act on these bills until October 2023, prompting the State to file a writ petition on October 31, 2023.

b. Governor’s Actions

On November 13, 2023, after the Supreme Court issued notice, the Governor withheld assent to 10 bills without providing reasons (simpliciter withholding) and reserved two bills for the President’s consideration.    

The State Legislature convened a special session on November 18, 2023, and repassed the 10 bills without changes, forwarding them again to the Governor.    

On November 28, 2023, the Governor reserved these 10 repassed bills for the President’s consideration, citing repugnancy with Entry 66 of the Union List, despite earlier acknowledging their intra-vires status under State and Concurrent Lists.

c. President’s Actions: Of the 10 bills reserved, the President withheld assent to seven, granted assent to one, and two remained pending as of the judgment date.

d. State’s Grievance: The State argued that the Governor’s initial inaction, simpliciter withholding of assent, and subsequent reservation of repassed bills were unconstitutional, arbitrary, and mala fide, violating Article 200 and the Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Punjab v. Principal Secretary to the Governor of Punjab (2024).


B. Sanction for Prosecution

a. Context: Between April 2022 and May 2023, the State submitted four files to the Governor seeking sanction to prosecute public servants under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. These files remained pending until the writ petition was filed.

b. Governor’s Response:

After the Supreme Court’s notice, the Governor acted on three files: sanction was granted for two on

November 13 and 18, 2023, while one file was returned on November 15, 2023, seeking an authenticated

investigation report.

The fourth file remained under consideration since May 2023.

c. State’s Grievance: The State alleged that the delays in granting sanctions impeded anti-corruption

efforts and governance.


C. Premature Release of Prisoners

a. Context: Between June and August 2023, the State forwarded 53 files to the Governor for approval of

premature prisoner releases.

b. Governor’s Response: The Governor’s office reported that, since September 2021, 580 proposals

were received, with 362 approved, 165 rejected, and 53 pending. The pending files were recent (June

August 2023), and no further updates were provided post-December 1, 2023.

c. State’s Grievance: The State highlighted delays in processing these files, affecting prisoner rights and

rehabilitation.


D. Appointments to the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (TNPSC)

a. Context: The TNPSC, per its regulations, requires a Chairman and 14 members, but was functioning

with only four members. The State submitted proposals for appointments, which the Governor returned

on September 27, 2023, raising queries about transparency, tenure, and candidate credentials.

b. Governor’s Response: The Governor returned the files again on October 26, 2023, claiming

unresolved queries, asserting the matter was no longer pending.

c. State’s Grievance: The State argued that the Governor’s queries were against established practices

and that delays hindered TNPSC’s functioning, affecting recruitment and promotions.


E. Dismissal and Allocation of Ministers

a. Context:

Senthil Balaji: On June 29, 2023, the Governor unilaterally recommended dismissing Minister Senthil

Balaji, who was arrested by the Enforcement Directorate, but later kept the decision in abeyance after

advice from the Union Home Minister.

Dr. K. Ponmudy: Dr. Ponmudy, a convicted minister, had his conviction suspended by the Supreme

Court on March 11, 2024. The State requested his reappointment as a minister on March 13, 2024, but

the Governor declined on March 17, 2024, citing “constitutional morality” and the interim nature of the

suspension.

b. Judicial Intervention: The Supreme Court, on March 22, 2024, expressed displeasure at the

Governor’s refusal, prompting Dr. Ponmudy’s swearing-in, and the related interlocutory application was

disposed of.

c. State’s Grievance: The State argued that the Governor’s actions were contrary to the Council of

Ministers’ advice and judicial orders, undermining democratic governance.


2. Submissions of the Parties

A. Petitioner (State of Tamil Nadu)

The State, represented by Senior Counsel Rakesh Dwivedi, made the following key arguments:

a. Constitutional Errors by the Governor:

Pocket Veto: The Governor’s prolonged inaction on bills (2020–2023) constituted an unconstitutional

“pocket veto,” not permissible under Article 200, which mandates action using the term “shall declare.” Simpliciter Withholding: The Governor’s withholding of assent without reasons violated the first proviso

to Article 200 and the State of Punjab ruling, breaching transparency and Article 14.

Improper Reservation: Reserving repassed bills for the President was illegal, as Article 200 mandates

assent post-reconsideration unless the bill is materially altered.

President’s Non-Speaking Orders: The President’s withholding of assent under Article 201 without

reasons violated the proviso to Article 201, rendering such actions void.

b. Justiciability and Judicial Review:

No constitutional power, including the Governor’s under Article 200, is immune from judicial review. Citing

cases like S.R. Bommai (1994) and Rameshwar Prasad (2006), the State argued that unconstitutional,

arbitrary, or mala fide actions are justiciable.

c. Aid and Advice of Council of Ministers:

The Governor must act on the Council of Ministers’ advice under Article 200, except in specific

discretionary cases (e.g., second proviso). Historical debates and the removal of “in his discretion” from

the Government of India Act, 1935, support this view.

The Governor’s unilateral actions, such as reserving bills or dismissing ministers, violated parliamentary

democracy and federalism.

d. Relief Sought: Declare the Governor’s actions unconstitutional, deem the bills assented, and direct

prompt action on pending files.

B. Respondents (Governor and Union)

Governor’s Defense:

The Governor argued that withholding assent simpliciter was permissible, citing Union of India v. Valluri

Basavaiah Chowdhary (1979), and that the State Legislature’s reconsideration was premature.

Reservation of bills was justified due to perceived repugnancy with Union List Entry 66, and the Governor

acted within his discretion.

Delays were attributed to the need for thorough review, and actions were taken post-notice (e.g.,

prosecution sanctions, bill decisions).

Union’s Role: The Union’s stance was limited, as the President’s actions followed the Governor’s

reservations. The Union did not strongly contest the State’s arguments but relied on the Governor’s

discretion.


3. Issues for Consideration

The Court framed several key issues, primarily focusing on the Governor’s powers under Article 200:

1. What courses of action are available to the Governor under Article 200?

2. Can the Governor reserve a bill for the President’s consideration after it is repassed by the Legislature

under the first proviso?

3. Is there a constitutionally prescribed time limit for the Governor’s actions under Article 200?

4. Must the Governor act only on the Council of Ministers’ advice under Article 200?

5. Is the Governor’s discretion under Article 200 subject to judicial review? If so, what are the

parameters?

6. How must the President act under Article 201 when a bill is reserved?

7. Should the Court exercise its powers under Article 142 to grant relief?


4. Historical and Legal Background

The judgment traces the evolution of Article 200, drawing from:

A. Historical Documents: Pre-independence documents like the Nehru Report (1928) and the

Government of India Act, 1935 (Section 75), which granted Governors discretionary powers, later curtailed in the Constitution.

B. Constituent Assembly Debates: Dr. B.R. Ambedkar and T.T. Krishnamachari emphasized that the Governor’s role in assenting to bills is not discretionary but guided by the Council of Ministers, aligning with responsible government principles.


C. Commissions and Reports:

a. First Administrative Reforms Commission (1966): Advocated timely action by Governors.

b. Rajamannar Commission (1971): Suggested Governors act as constitutional heads, not agents of the Center.

c. Sarkaria Commission (1988): Recommended expeditious action on bills and limited discretion.

d. Punchhi Commission (2010): Reiterated the need for time-bound decisions and adherence to ministerial advice.

e. International Jurisprudence: Practices in the UK, Canada, and Australia show constitutional heads acting on ministerial advice, with limited discretion.


5. Analysis and Findings

The Court’s analysis addresses each issue comprehensively, establishing precedents and guidelines:


A. Courses of Action Under Article 200

a. Options: The Governor has three options: (1) grant assent, (2) withhold assent, or (3) reserve the bill for the President’s consideration.

b. First Proviso: Withholding assent triggers the first proviso, requiring the Governor to return the bill with a message for reconsideration “as soon as possible.” This is mandatory, not discretionary, as per State of Punjab (2024).

c. No Pocket or Absolute Veto: The terms “shall declare” and “as soon as possible” preclude inaction (pocket veto) or outright rejection without reconsideration (absolute veto).


B. Reservation of Repassed Bills

a. General Rule: Once a bill is reconsidered and repassed under the first proviso, the Governor “shall not withhold assent therefrom” (Article 200). Reservation for the President is impermissible unless the repassed bill is materially different from the original.

b. Exception: Reservation is allowed if the bill falls under the second proviso (derogating High Court powers) or specific constitutional provisions requiring Presidential assent (e.g., Articles 31A, 254(2)).

c. Present Case: The Governor’s reservation of the 10 repassed bills was illegal, as they were unchanged and intra-vires, rendering subsequent Presidential actions void.


C. Time Limits

a. No Express Limit: Article 200 does not specify a time limit, but the phrase “as soon as possible” implies urgency.

b. Reasonable Time: Citing A.G. Perarivalan (2022) and Keisham Meghachandra Singh (2020), the Court held that powers must be exercised within a reasonable time.

c. Prescribed Timelines:

Withholding assent or reserving for President (with ministerial advice): Maximum one month.

Withholding assent (contrary to advice): Maximum three months, with a message.

Reserving for President (contrary to advice): Maximum three months.

Post-reconsideration assent: Maximum one month.

d. Judicial Review: Failure to comply with these timelines subjects the Governor’s inaction to judicial review.


D. Aid and Advice

a. General Rule: The Governor must act on the Council of Ministers’ advice under Article 200, except in cases expressly requiring discretion (e.g., second proviso, Article 163(1)).

b. Exceptions:

Bills derogating High Court powers (second proviso).

Bills requiring Presidential assent (e.g., Articles 31A, 254(2)).

Bills threatening representative democracy.

c. Historical Context: The removal of “in his discretion” from the Government of India Act, 1935, indicates the Governor’s role as a constitutional head, not an independent authority.

d. Samsher Singh (1974): The Court reaffirmed that the Governor acts on ministerial advice except in specific discretionary spheres, overruling B.K. Pavitra (2019) as per incuriam for suggesting broad discretion and non-justiciability.


E. Judicial Review

a. Scope: All constitutional powers, including those under Article 200, are subject to judicial review unless expressly excluded. Justiciability depends on the subject matter, not the source of power (Indra Sawhney, 1992).

b. Parameters for Review:

Governor’s Actions:

Reservation under the second proviso: Justiciable if the bill does not derogate High Court powers.

Reservation for Presidential assent: Challengeable if reasons are absent, irrelevant, or mala fide.

Reservation on democratic peril grounds: Justiciable if reasons are inadequate or arbitrary.

Other grounds (e.g., personal dissatisfaction): Impermissible and liable to be set aside.

Inaction beyond prescribed timelines: Subject to mandamus.

President’s Actions:

Withholding assent for policy-driven bills (e.g., Article 254(2)): Limited review for arbitrariness or mala fides.

Withholding for constitutional peril: Fully justiciable, with a preference for Article 143 reference.

Inaction beyond three months: Subject to mandamus.

Article 143: The President should refer bills reserved on constitutional grounds to the Supreme Court for advisory opinions, which carry high persuasive value.


F. President’s Role Under Article 201

a. Options: The President must either grant assent or withhold it, accompanied by reasons under the proviso to Article 201. No pocket or absolute veto is permissible.

b. Time Limit: Decisions must be made within three months, with reasons for delays communicated.

c. Judicial Review: Withholding assent is justiciable, particularly for legal or constitutional issues, ensuring accountability.


G. Exercise of Article 142

a. Rationale: The Court invoked Article 142 to do complete justice due to: Prolonged delays (some bills pending since 2020).

The Governor’s lack of bona fides, evidenced by ignoring State of Punjab and reserving repassed bills.

The need to uphold legislative will and public welfare.

b. Relief: The Court deemed the 10 bills assented to on November 18, 2023, when they were repassed, bypassing further delays by the Governor.


6. Conclusion

The Court answered the formulated questions and issued the following key rulings:


A. On Article 200:

a. The Governor’s options are assent, withholding with reconsideration, or reservation for the President.

b. Withholding assent mandates compliance with the first proviso.

c. No pocket or absolute veto exists.

d. Reservation of repassed bills is generally impermissible.


B. Timelines: Specific time limits ensure expeditious action, with judicial review for non-compliance.


C. Aid and Advice: The Governor is bound by ministerial advice, except in limited discretionary cases.


D. Judicial Review: The Governor’s and President’s actions are justiciable, with defined parameters.


E. Article 142: The 10 bills were deemed assented to, addressing the Governor’s unconstitutional actions.


F. Broader Observations:

a. The Governor must act as a constitutional head, respecting parliamentary democracy and federalism.

b. Constitutional authorities must uphold the Constitution’s values, avoiding political expediency.

c. The judgment quotes Dr. B.R. Ambedkar to emphasize the importance of constitutional functionaries’

integrity.


7. Significance and Implications


A. Constitutional Clarity

a. The judgment clarifies the Governor’s role under Article 200, aligning it with parliamentary democracy and federal principles. It limits discretionary powers, reinforcing the primacy of elected governments.

b. The prescribed timelines prevent delays, ensuring legislative efficiency and accountability.


B. Strengthening Federalism

a. By curbing the Governor’s ability to unilaterally reserve bills or delay actions, the judgment protects State autonomy, addressing tensions in Center-State relations.

b. The emphasis on pre-legislative consultation (e.g., Tamil Nadu Business Rules) promotes cooperative federalism.


C. Judicial Review and Accountability

a. The detailed framework for judicial review ensures that Governors and the President act within constitutional bounds, enhancing checks and balances.

b. The use of Article 143 for constitutional questions reinforces the judiciary’s role in resolving disputes.


D. Precedent for Governance

a. The ruling sets a precedent for resolving similar disputes in other States, particularly where Governors act as impediments to State legislatures.

b. It underscores the Governor’s role as a “friend, philosopher, and guide,” not an inhibitor of governance.


E. Article 142’s Application

a. The invocation of Article 142 to deem assent reflects the Court’s commitment to practical justice,

avoiding further delays in a politically charged context.


8. Critical Observations


A. Strengths

a. Comprehensive Analysis: The judgment meticulously examines historical, legal, and international perspectives, grounding its findings in constitutional principles.

b. Timelines: The introduction of specific time limits is a pragmatic step to prevent legislative gridlock.

c. Judicial Review Framework: The detailed grounds for challenging Governors’ and Presidents’ actions provide clarity for future litigation.

d. Federal Balance: The ruling balances State autonomy with the Center’s oversight, promoting harmonious governance.


B. Potential Concerns

a. Article 142’s Scope: Deeming assent under Article 142, while justified, bypasses the Governor’s role, potentially raising questions about judicial overreach.

b. Practical Implementation: Enforcing timelines and ensuring Governors’ compliance may face challenges, especially in politically polarized contexts.

c. Limited Focus on Other Issues: The judgment focuses heavily on bills, with less attention to prosecution sanctions, prisoner releases, and TNPSC appointments, which remain unresolved.


9. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s judgment in The State of Tamil Nadu v. The Governor of Tamil Nadu & Anr. is a pivotal contribution to Indian constitutional law, clarifying the Governor’s role under Article 200 and reinforcing democratic and federal principles. By setting timelines, limiting discretion, and affirming judicial review, the Court ensures that Governors act as constitutional heads, not obstacles to State governance. The deeming of assent under Article 142 addresses immediate injustices, while the broader guidelines offer a roadmap for resolving similar disputes. The judgment’s emphasis on constitutional values and the people’s will underscores its significance in upholding India’s democratic framework.

Key Takeaway: The Governor must act expeditiously, transparently, and in accordance with ministerial advice, respecting the legislature’s primacy and the Constitution’s spirit. Any deviation invites judicial scrutiny, ensuring accountability and the smooth functioning of India’s federal democracy.

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