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Interfaith Marriage Between A Hindu and A Muslim not Valid Even if Registered under the Special Marriage Act

An interfaith couple (Hindu-Muslim) approached the MP High Court at Jabalpur seeking protection from their family members as they wanted to get married under the Special Marriage Act of 1954, however, the families objected to the said marriage. The couple relied upon the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court in Lata Singh Vs. State of U.P. reported in (2006) 5 SCC 475, wherein, it was directed that administration/police authorities shall ensure that no inter-caste or inter-faith couple, who have attained majority, is harassed by anyone or subjected to threats or acts of violence, and if such threats extended or harassment caused or act of violence committed, he/she should be strictly prosecuted according to law.     

The issues before the HC

Whether the marriage of a Muslim boy with a Hindu girl be a valid marriage or not?

To answer the issue, the HC strongly relied upon a judgment delivered by a division bench of the SC in Mohammed Salim (D) Through LRs. & Ors. Vs. Shamsudeen (D) Through LRs. & Ors. in Civil Appeal No.5158/2013, wherein, the SC considered the validity of a marriage between a Muslim man and a Hindu woman in an appeal arising out of a partition suit and the SC held that such a marriage is neither a valid (sahih) nor a void (batil) marriage, but is merely an irregular (fasid) marriage. The SC in Md. Salim (Supra) placed heavy reliance on the Mulla’s Principles of Mahommedan Law (21st edition) that comments at page 345 “A Mahomedan male may contract a valid marriage not only with a Mahomedan woman, but also with a Kitabia, that is, a Jewess or a Christian, but not with an idolatress or a fire worshipper. A marriage, however, with an idolatress or a fire­worshipper, is not void, but merely irregular

The HC after analyzing the Mulla’s Principles of Mahommedan Law and the judgment of SC in Md. Salim (Supra) held that “14. As per Mahomedan law, the marriage of a Muslim boy with a girl who is an idolatress or a fire-worshipper, is not a valid marriage. Even if the marriage is registered under the Special Marriage Act, the marriage would be no more a valid marriage and it would be an irregular (fasid) marriage”.


Whether the Special Marriage Act would override the personal law?

The HC held that under personal law, the performance of certain rituals is necessary for solemnization of marriage. However, if marriage is performed under the Special Marriage Act, then such marriage cannot be challenged on the ground of non-performance of such mandatory rituals. But marriage under Special Marriage Act would not legalise the marriage which otherwise is prohibited under personal law. Section 4 of the Special Marriage Act provides that if the parties are not within the prohibited relationship then only marriage can be performed.


The HC also noted that Mulla’s Principles of Mahomedan Law (21st Edition) comments at page 259 that a mahomedan male may contract a valid marriage with a mahomedan, Kitabia(Jewess), or Christian woman, but not with an idolatress or a fire-worshipper. However, a mahomedan woman cannot contract a valid marriage except with a mahomedan. A marriage in contravention of the same is irregular, not void. 



WRIT PETITION No. 9589 of 2024


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