Writ Petition is Maintainable Against the Private Educational Institution

On 24/08/2022, A Division Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 5789 of 2022 titled St. Mary’s Education Society & Anr. Vs. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava & Ors., has reiterated the law related to the maintainability of a writ petition against a private unaided minority educational institution, wherein, respondent no.1 was employed in St. Mary’s  Higher  Secondary  School which is being run by the appellant no. 1 and his services were terminated on the ground of misconduct in service. Respondent no. 1 challenged the order of termination on various grounds before the Disciplinary Committee which was ordered to be dismissed. Respondent no. 1 invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 which was dismissed by the Hon’ble Single Judge on the ground of non-maintainability and thereafter the said order was challenged before a division bench that set aside the order passed by the Single Judge.

The abovesaid school is a private unaided minority educational institution without any aid or control of the Government or any instrumentality of the Government and therefore, not a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, which enjoys the protection guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution. There is absolutely no Governmental control over the functioning and administration of the school

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The questions before Supreme Court

1. Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is maintainable against a private unaided minority institution?

2. Whether a service dispute in the private realm involving a private educational institution and its employee can be adjudicated in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution?

Supreme Court’s Observation

1. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable against a person or a body discharging public duties or public functions. The public duty cast may be either statutory or otherwise and where it is otherwise, the body or the person must be shown to owe that duty or obligation to the public involving the public law element. Similarly, for ascertaining the discharge of public function, it must be established that the body or the person was seeking to achieve the same for the collective benefit of the public or a section of it and the authority to do so must be accepted by the public.

2. Even if it is assumed that an educational institution is imparting public duty, the act complained of must have a direct nexus with the discharge of public duty. It is indisputably a public law action that confers a right upon the aggrieved to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 for a prerogative writ. Individual wrongs or breaches of mutual contracts without having any public element as its integral part cannot be rectified through a writ petition under Article 226. Wherever Courts have intervened in their exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, either the service conditions were regulated by the statutory provisions or the employer had the status of “State” within the expansive definition under Article 12 or it was found that the action complained of has public law element.

3. It must be consequently held that while a body may be discharging a public function or performing a public duty and thus its actions becoming amenable to judicial review by a Constitutional Court, its employees would not have the right to invoke the powers of the High Court conferred by Article 226 in respect of a matter relating to service where they are not governed or controlled by the statutory provisions. An educational institution may perform myriad functions touching various facets of public life and in the societal sphere. While such of those functions as would fall within the domain of a "public function" or "public duty" be undisputedly open to challenge and scrutiny under Article 226 of the Constitution, the actions or decisions taken solely within the confines of an ordinary contract of service, having no statutory force or backing, cannot be recognized as being amenable to challenge under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the absence of the service conditions being controlled or governed by statutory provisions, the matter would remain in the realm of an ordinary contract of service.

4. Even if it be perceived that imparting education by the private unaided school is a public duty within the expanded expression of the term, an employee of a non­teaching   staff engaged by the school for the purpose of its administration or internal management is only an agency created by it. It is immaterial whether “A” or “B” is employed by the school to discharge that duty. In any case, the terms of employment of a contract between a school and non­teaching staff cannot and should not be construed to be an inseparable part of the obligation to impart education. This is particularly in respect to the disciplinary proceedings that may be initiated against a particular employee. It is only where the removal of an employee of non­teaching staff is regulated by some statutory provisions, that its violation by the employer in contravention of law may be interfered with by the court. But such interference will be on the ground of breach of law and not on the basis of interference in the discharge of public duty. 

5. From the pleadings in the original writ petition, it is apparent that no element of any public law is agitated or otherwise made out. In other words, the action challenged has no public element, and a writ of mandamus cannot be issued as the action was essentially of a private character

The impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court were set aside.