Skip to main content

Judicial Review of the Power of Remission

On 22/04/2022, A Division Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 49 of 2022, titled Ram Chander Vs. The State of Chhattisgarh & Anr. has discussed the laws touching upon the following areas -

*Judicial Review of the Power of Remission

*The Value of the Opinion of the Presiding Judge


In the present case, Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment for committing the offence of murder and spent 16 years in jail without remission and submitted an application for premature release which was rejected by the State on the ground that the Presiding Officer (whose opinion was sought under section 432(2) of Cr.P.C.) opined against releasing the Petitioner on remission. In 2022, Petitioner had completed 20 years of imprisonment and his remission request was again rejected on the same ground. 

Hence, the Petitioner has instituted a writ petition Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking direction for his premature release. 


Judicial Review of the Power of Remission

Hon’ble Supreme Court while observing, that discretion vests with the government to suspend or remit the sentence, the executive power cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The prerogative of the executive is subject to the rule of law and fairness in state action embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution, referred to a judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the matter of State of Haryana Vs. Mohinder Singh reported as (2000) 3 SCC 394, wherein it was held, that “Prisoners have no absolute right for the remission of their sentence unless except what is prescribed by law and the circular issued thereunder. That special remission shall not apply to a prisoner convicted of a particular offence can certainly be a relevant consideration for the State Government not to exercise the power of remission in that case. The power of remission, however, cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The decision to grant remission has to be well informed, reasonable, and fair to all concerned.”

   

Hon’ble Court has held, that “while the court can review the decision of the government to determine whether it was arbitrary, it cannot usurp the power of the government and grant remission itself. Where the exercise of power by the executive is found to be arbitrary, the authorities may be directed to consider the case of the convict afresh.”


Hon’ble Court has further referred to another judgment, to illustrate the factors that govern the grant of remission, delivered in the matter of Laxman Naskar Vs. Union of India reported as (2000) 2 SCC 595, wherein the following factors that are to be taken into consideration while dealing with the application for remission were carved out -  

(i) Whether the offence is an individual act of crime without affecting the society at large. 

(ii) Whether there is any chance of future recurrence of committing the crime. 

(iii) Whether the convict has lost his potentiality in committing the crime. 

(iv) Whether there is any fruitful purpose of confining this convict anymore. 

(v) Socio-economic condition of the convict's family.


Hon’ble Supreme Court while referring to its judgment delivered in the case of Rajan Vs. Home Secretary, Home Department of Tamil Nadu reported as (2019) 14 SCC 114, held, that “the Court has the power to review the decision of the government regarding the acceptance or rejection of an application for remission under Section 432 of the CrPC to determine whether the decision is arbitrary in nature. The Court is empowered to direct the government to reconsider its decision.”


The Value of the Opinion of the Presiding Judge

Sub-section (2) of Section 432 of the CrPC provides that the appropriate government may take the opinion of the presiding judge of the court before or by which the person making an application for remission has been convicted on whether the application should be allowed or rejected, together with the reasons for such opinion.


Hon’ble Supreme Court while referring to its judgment delivered by a Constitution Bench in the case of Union of India Vs. Sriharan @Murugan reported as (2014) 4 SCC 242, held, that “in Sriharan (supra), the Court observed that the opinion of the presiding judge shines a light on the nature of the crime that has been committed, the record of the convict, their background and other relevant factors. Crucially, the Court observed that the opinion of the presiding judge would enable the government to take the ‘right’ decision as to whether or not the sentence should be remitted. Hence, it cannot be said that the opinion of the presiding judge is only a relevant factor, which does not have any determinative effect on the application for remission. The purpose of the procedural safeguard under Section 432 (2) of the CrPC would stand defeated if the opinion of the presiding judge becomes just another factor that may be taken into consideration by the government while deciding the application for remission. It is possible then that the procedure under Section 432 (2) would become a mere formality.

However, this is not to say that the appropriate government should mechanically follow the opinion of the presiding judge. If the opinion of the presiding judge does not comply with the requirements of Section 432 (2) or if the judge does not consider the relevant factors for grant of remission that have been laid down in Laxman Naskar v. Union of India (supra), the government may request the presiding judge to consider the matter afresh.” 


Lastly, the Hon’ble Court has held, that an opinion accompanied by inadequate reasoning would not satisfy the requirements of Section 432 (2) of the CrPC. Further, it will not serve the purpose for which the exercise under Section 432 (2) is to be undertaken, which is to enable the executive to make an informed decision taking into consideration all the relevant factors.”

Hon'ble Court while allowing the Writ Petition directed the application for remission to be re-considered.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

All Cases of Sexual Intercourse Based on a False Promise of Marriage NOT Covered under Section 69 of the BNS

Recently, a First Information Report (FIR) was registered against Yash Dayal, a Royal Challengers Bangalore (RCB) player, under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) for engaging in sexual intercourse on the false pretext of marriage. The complainant alleged that, relying on Yash Dayal’s false promise of marriage, she consented to sexual intercourse. Notably, the FIR was not registered under Section 64 (rape) of the BNS. This raises the question: Are all cases of sexual intercourse based on a false promise of marriage (vitiated consent) now exclusively covered under Section 69 of the BNS? Prior to the enactment of the BNS, sexual intercourse induced by a false promise of marriage was punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and classified as rape. This classification stemmed from Section 375 of the IPC, which defines rape as, inter alia, sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, and Section 90, which states that consent given under a misconceptio...

Requirements for Criminal Liability under Sections 406 and 420 IPC

The Supreme Court of India’s judgment in Ashok Kumar Jain v. The State of Gujarat and Another (2025 INSC 614), delivered on May 1, 2025, is a significant exposition on the exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), to quash a First Information Report (FIR) in cases where allegations of criminal breach of trust and cheating under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) are deemed to be a misuse of criminal process for civil disputes. The judgment meticulously analyzes the alleged offenses' legal ingredients, the commercial transaction's factual matrix, and the documentary evidence, ultimately concluding that the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process. Factual Background The case arises from a commercial transaction between the appellant, Ashok Kumar Jain, a director of Maayu Import and Export Ltd., a Sri Lankan company, and the second respondent, a proprietor of Ansh Prints, a textile business in Surat, Gujara...

Advocates Vs. CAs/CSs/CMAs

This article deals with the exclusive right to practise law and tribunal representation and the principles relating to a Harmonious Construction of the Advocates Act, 1961 and the Companies Act, 2013 Introduction  The ongoing controversy concerning the right of non-advocate professionals, namely Chartered Accountants(CAs), Company Secretaries(CSs), and Cost and Management Accountants(CMAs), to appear and argue matters before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) raises fundamental questions touching the statutory monopoly over the practice of law in India. This post examines the competing statutory claims under the Advocates Act, 1961 and Section 432 of the Companies Act, 2013, applies the doctrine of harmonious construction, and concludes that Section 432 does not, and constitutionally cannot, confer any independent or parallel right to practise law upon non-advocates before tribunals. Background of the Dispute Recently, t...