On 10/08/2021, A Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeal No. 1154 of 2018, titled Parubai Vs. The State of Maharashtra has reiterated the principles relating to circumstantial evidence, wherein, the prosecution's case is that Gulab (A2) was married to the deceased Mandabai and they had two children, namely Akash and Nikita aged 5 and 2 years respectively. Gulab had an extramarital affair with the appellant (A1) and ultimately married her on 02/01/2006 and got their marriage registered on 18/02/2006. thereafter, Gulab and his wives started living together. The parents of Gulab were also living with them. Gulab had gone to Jalna on 02/08/2006 to procure tyres for the tractor and his mother had gone to her daughter's place to assist her for delivery.
on the intervening night of 2/3/08/2006 at about 2.30 to 3.00 am an incident of fire occurred and the house in which the appellant and her family were residing was engulfed in flames. The appellant who was also in the house had come out of the house unscathed while Mandabai the first wife of Gulab and their daughter Nikita rushed out of the house with burn injuries, while their son Akash got burnt to death inside the house. The father-in-law of the appellant was stated to be sleeping outside the house instructed the servant to secure a jeep and shift them to the hospital. On the next day, Mandabai and her daughter Nikita died due to burn injuries suffered by them.
FIR was registered at the behest of the father-in-law of the appellant and he had also implicated the appellant. Furthermore, keeping in view the allegation made by Chhaya, the deceased's sister, the husband of the appellant, and the mother-in-law were also included and charged for the offence as accused Nos. 2 and 3.
Opinion and Judgment of the Trial Court
The Sessions Court was of the opinion that:
1. The case against the accused Nos. 2 and 3 had not been proved and the evidence of the PW2 (Chhaya) to implicate them was not trustworthy.
2. The appellant had a strong motive and had the opportunity of committing the act.
3. If the appellant is to be excluded, there should have been a reasonable possibility of anyone else being the real culprit, as such the chain of evidence can be considered to be complete to show that in all probabilities the crime must have been committed by the appellant. For this the appellant sleeping in the same room as the deceased was sleeping and that the appellant did not suffer any injuries as the circumstances to rule out the possibility of accidental fire.
4. Since the appellant had not explained how she came out of the room without any burn injuries, coupled with the kerosene residues traced on the frock of Nikita, therefore, an adverse inference can be drawn that the appellant set fire to the house.
5. The fact that the appellant was the second wife and the husband of the appellant had executed an agreement transferring his land in favour of deceased Mandabai was the motive to commit the offence, more particularly since she wanted to establish her dominance in the house.
6. Father-in-law of the appellant had stated that the appellant had made a confession to him that she had sprinkled kerosene and set fire.
7. Hence, the appellant had committed the offence punishable under sections 302 and 436 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Opinion and Judgment of the High Court
1. The High Court while considering the matter and appreciating the evidence had discarded the extrajudicial confession and further disbelieved the evidence of the father-in-law of the appellant.
2. The High Court ultimately arrived at its conclusion that the appellant is guilty of committing the offence since admittedly the appellant had not sustained the slightest injury due to the fire which means that she left the house well in advance to the spreading of fire. The circumstance held against the appellant is that she did not try to alarm the deceased Mandabai and her children to leave the house so as to save them from fire, nor did she try to bring the small children out of the house to save their lives. The High Court further assumed that she did not shout immediately and waited until the deceased Mandabai and her children were fully caught by flames.
The substantial issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court
The substantial issue was as to whether the chain of circumstances to convict the appellant is complete.
Hon'ble Supreme Court noted that "the High Court has held the appellant guilty on the preponderance of probability rather than reaching a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. Though it has employed the phrase 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in its concluding paragraph, the reasoning preceding the same are only conjectures and surmises. The sole circumstance noted by the High Court with reference to the evidence is that the burnt frock of deceased Nikita was seized, vide Panchnama (Exh. 34), and the evidence of PW8 that the frock had been sent for chemical analysis and the report as per Exh. 50 shows that Kerosene residues were detected thereon. in that circumstance, the High Court has held that kerosene was used for setting the deceased Nikita on fire. Even if that was taken as a circumstance in the chain, the same was insufficient unless the other circumstances in the chain were connected to point at the appellant. In that regard, what is relevant to be noted is that the High Court has in its earlier part of the reasoning disbelieved the recovery of the can which is stated who have smelt of kerosene since the said can had not been sent for chemical analysis and also the circumstance under which it was said to have been recovered."
Further, it was noted that "if that be the position, even if the chemical analysis report referring to the frock is accepted there is nothing on record to connect that the appellant was responsible for the sprinkling of the kerosene or for the kerosene to have come in the contact with the frock of Nikita which is said to have been recovered from the place of occurrence. That apart, the declaration of Mandabai, the deceased on 03/08/2006 discloses that since there is no electricity in the agricultural field, they sleep in the house and keep a lantern in the night for which kerosene is obviously used. Further, it has come in evidence that in the said house cooking is also done and the material pertaining to the tractor including diesel can was also kept therein. Therefore, the circumstances that the appellant was not injured in the incident cannot be the basis to rely on the presence of kerosene stains on the frock as a circumstance that she had set fire by sprinkling kerosene."
The Five Golden Principles
Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to its earlier landmark judgment delivered in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs. The State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116, wherein it has been held that,
"153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1.) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should" and not "may be" established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade Vs. State of Maharashtra where the observations were made:
Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.
(2.) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty.
(3.) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency,
(4.) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and
(5.) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."
Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that "the mere suspicion would not be sufficient unless the circumstantial evidence tendered by the prosecution leads to the conclusion that it "must be true" and not "may be true"." In this regard, Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to a judgment delivered in the case of Devilal Vs. State of Rajasthan (2019) 19 SCC 447, wherein it was held that,
"17. It has further been considered by this Court in Sujit Biswas Vs. State of Assam 2013 (12) SCC 406 and Raja Vs. State of Haryana 2015 (11) SCC 43. It has been propounded that while scrutinizing the circumstantial evidence, a court has to evaluate it to ensure the chain of events is established clearly and completely to rule out any reasonable likelihood of innocence of the accused. The underlying principle is whether the chain is complete or not, indeed it would depend on the facts of each case emanating from the evidence and there cannot be a straightjacket formula that can be laid down for the purpose. But the circumstances adduced when considered collectively must lead only to the conclusion that there cannot be a person other than the accused who alone is the perpetrator of the crime alleged and the circumstances must establish the conclusive nature consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.
19. That apart, in the case of circumstantial evidence, two views are possible on the case of record, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other his innocence. The accused is indeed entitled to have the benefit of one which is favorable to him. All the judicial laid parameters, defining the quality and content of the circumstantial evidence, bring home the guilt of the accused on a criminal charge, we find no difficulty to hold that the prosecution, in the case in hand, has failed to meet the same."
Hon'ble Supreme Court, while reversing the judgment of conviction pronounced by Sessions Court and High Court, held that "the High Court holding the appellant guilty of pouring kerosene around the deceased and her children and setting them on fire since the appellant had failed to explain the reason for the eruption of fire in view of such obligation to explain under section 106 is also not sustainable in the present circumstance. As held in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra) the failure to explain can only be held as an additional link to complete the chain of circumstance. In the instant case, since the other circumstances in the chain are not established, the same cannot be held against the appellant. On the other hand, the case itself is that the fire had erupted at midnight when the appellant and others were sleeping and she comes out shouting. The explanation for the cause of the fire by the appellant would have arisen only if there was any other evidence to the effect that the appellant was already awake and was outside even before the fire erupted. Thus taking into consideration all these aspects in the facts and circumstances of this case we are of the opinion that the appellant is entitled to be acquitted as the benefit of the doubt weighs in her favour. We are therefore unable to sustain the order of conviction of the appellant."
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