Laws Under Section 304-B, IPC Read With Section 113B, IEA

On 28/05/2021, a division bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeal No. 1735-1736 of 2010, titled Satbir Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana, has laid down principles of conduction of trial of the cases relating to dowry death Under Section 304-B of IPC, wherein, the prosecution's case was that the deceased committed suicide by setting herself ablaze just after one year of her marriage and that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty and harassment on account of bringing less dowry by both the accused. The trial court convicted the appellants for offences Under Sections 304-B and 306 of IPC. The appellants preferred an appeal to High Court challenging the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court but the High Court upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellants and dismissed the appeal.

Two issues were to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the instant case:

I. Whether the trial court, and the High Court, was correct in convicting the accused on the charge Under Section 304-B of IPC?

II. Whether the trial court, and the High Court, was correct in convincing the accused on the charge Under Section 306 of IPC?

First Issue

Hon'ble Supreme court, while analyzing the law on dowry death, has referred to its earlier judgment in the case of Major Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2015) 5 SCC 201, wherein, it was held that 

"10. To sustain the conviction Under Section 304B IPC, the following essential ingredients are to be established: 

(i) the death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a 'normal circumstance;

(ii) such a death should have occurred within seven years of her marriage;

(iii) she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband;

(iv) such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with demand of dowry; and 

(v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have been meted out to the woman soon before her death"

Hon'ble Supreme Court, while referring to its judgments in the cases of Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai Vs. Dilip Kumar & Company, (2018) 9 SCC 1, State of Gujarat Vs. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 412, has held that "the first contentious part that exists in the interpretation of Section 304-B, IPC relates to the phrase "soon before" used in the Section. Being a criminal statute, generally, it is to be interpreted strictly. However, where strict interpretation leads to absurdity or goes against the spirit of legislation, the courts may in appropriate cases place reliance upon the genuine import of the words, taken in their usual sense to resolve such ambiguities."

Hon'ble Court has further held that "14. Considering the significance of such a legislation, a strict interpretation would defeat the very object for which it was enacted. Therefore, it is safe to deduce that when the legislature used the words, "soon before" they did not mean "immediately before". Rather, they left its determination in the hands of the courts. The factum of cruelty or harassment differs from case to case. Even the spectrum of cruelty is quite varied, as it can range from physical, verbal or even emotional. This list is certainly not exhaustive. No straitjacket formulae can therefore be laid down by this Court to define what exacts the phrase "soon before" entails."

Hon'ble Supreme Court then referred to its judgment in the case of Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207, wherein the aforesaid position was emphasized in the following term, "15. "Soon before" is a relative term which is required to be considered under specific circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formulae can be laid down by fixing any time limit. In relation to dowry deaths, the circumstances showing the existence of cruelty or harassment to the deceased are not restricted to a particular instance but normally refer to a course of conduct. Such conduct may be spread over a period of time. Proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the consequential death is required to be proved by the prosecution. The demand of dowry, cruelty or harassment based upon such demand and the date of death should not be too remote in time which, under the circumstances, be treated as having become stale enough."

Hon'ble Supreme Court has further referred to its judgment in the case of Bansi Lal Vs. State of Haryana, (2011) 11 SCC 359, wherein, the mandatory application of the presumption Under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act once the ingredients of Section 304-B of IPC stood proved was emphasized:

"19. It may be mentioned herein that the legislature in its wisdom has used the word 'shall' thus, making a mandatory application on the part of the court to presume that death had been committed by the person who had subjected her to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand of dowry. Therefore, in view of the above, onus lies on the accused to rebut the presumption and in case of Section 113B relatable to Section 304B IPC, the onus to prove shifts exclusively and heavily on the accused. 

20. Therefore, in the case the essential ingredients of such death have been established by the prosecution, it is the duty of the court to raise a presumption that the accused has caused the dowry death."

Hon'ble Court, while referring to its earlier judgments in Maya Devi Vs. State of Haryana, (2015) 17 SCC 405, Shanti Vs. State of Haryana, (1991) 1 SCC 371, has held that "Therefore, if all the other ingredients of Section 304B IPC are fulfilled, any death whether caused by burns or by bodily injury or occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances shall, as per the legislative mandate, be called a "dowry death" and the woman's husband or his relative "shall be deemed to have caused her death" unless proved otherwise. The section clearly specifies what constitutes the offence of dowry death and also identifies the single offender or multiple offenders who has or have caused the dowry death."

Hon'ble Supreme Court has noted that the doctor found the smell of kerosene oil on the body of the deceased who had suffered 85% burn injuries and it happened within seven years of marriage. Thereafter, on the issue of dowry demand, it was noted that the deceased had disclosed to her father and brothers (testified as PWs 6,7 and 10) that the accused husband and mother-in-law used to physically harass her on the account of bringing insufficient dowry. Furthermore, the accused persons had made a specific demand for a scooter. Statements of abovesaid witnesses were found, by the trial court and High Court, to be corroborative and consistent. 

Hon'ble Court, while agreeing with the above findings of the trial court and High Court, has held that "from the above analysis, it is clear that the prosecution was able to successfully prove that the death of the deceased due to burn injuries took place within approximately one year of her marriage. it has further been proved that soon before her death she was subjected to harassment and cruelty pursuant to demands of dowry. Since the ingredients of Section 304B, IPC stand satisfied, the presumption under 113B, Evidence Act operates against the appellants, who are deemed to have caused the offence specified under Section 304B of IPC."

It was further concluded by the trial court that either deceased committed suicide by sprinkling kerosene oil on her body or she was burnt by sprinkling kerosene on her body either by the accused or by somebody else.

It was further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that "Therefore, the presumption adumbrated in Section 113B, Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular case, which has not been rebutted by the accused-appellants herein. The appellants have failed to make out a case for us to interface in the concurrent opinions of the Courts below, convicting the accused-appellants under Section 304, IPC."  

Second Issue

Hon'ble Supreme Court, while analyzing the essential ingredients to constitute an offence Under Section 306 of IPC, has observed that "a bare reading of the provision indicates that for the offence Under Section 306, IPC the prosecution needs to first establish that a suicide has been committed. Secondly, the prosecution must also prove that the person who is aid to have abetted the commission of suicide, has played an active role in the same. With respect to thus latter reluirement, Section 113A, Evidnece Act creates a presumption against the husband and/or his relative with respect to the abutment of suicide of a married woman, under certain conditions. Not going into the other conditions, a perusal of the provision indicates that such presumption shall be attracted only if the factum of suicide has been established by the prosecution first."

At this stage, Hon'ble Court has referred to its judgment in the case of Wazir Chand Vs. State of Haryana, (1989) 1 SCC 244, wherein necessary ingredients were considered to constitute an offence Under Section 306 of IPC, "5. Reading Section 306 and 307 (sic 107) together it is clear that if any person instigates any other person to commit suicide and as a result of such investigation the other person sommits suicide, the person causing the instigation is liable to be punished under Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860 for abetting the commission of suicide. A plain reading of this provision shows that before a person can be convicted of abetting the suicide of any other person, it must be established that such other person committed suicide." 

In the light of above analysis, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "there was insufficient evidence to prove the factum of suicide beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption under Section 113A, Evidence Act, is not of much help for the prosecution. The essential ingredient of deceased committing suicide has not been proved by the prosecution by adducing sufficient evidence. In the present case, the prosecution has failed to establish that the death occurred due to suicide. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the finding of the Courts below convicting the appellants Under Section 306, IPC merits interference by this Court."

Lastly, Hon'ble Supreme Court has summarized the law Under Section 304-B of IPC read with Section 113-B of Evidence Act as follows:

1. Section 304B, IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.
2. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence Under Section 304-B, IPC. Once these ingredient are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided Under Section 113B, Evidence Act operates against the accused.
3. The phrase "soon before" as appearing in Section 304b, IPC cannot be construed to mean 'immdiately before'. the prosecution must establish existence of "proximate and live link" between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.
4. Section 304B, IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non categorization is due to the fact that death occurring "otherwise than normal circumstances" can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental.
5. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304B, IPC read with 113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial.
6. It is a matter of grave concern that, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice "audi alteram partem" as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the discriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution.
7. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the trial with due caution, keeping consideration the peculiarities of section 304B, IPC read with Section 113B, Evidence Act.
8. Section 232, CrPC provides that, "if, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal". Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts.
9. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for 'defence evidence', calling upon the accused to present hus defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused.
10. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics.
11. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment.
12. undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.