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Essential Ingredients Of Dowry Death Under Section 304-B, IPC

 


On 28/05/2021, a full bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Criminal Appeal No. 1731 of 2010, titled Gurmeet Singh Vs. State of Punjab has reiterated the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana relating to trial Under Section 304-B of IPC and decided a substantial question of law with regard to presumption Under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and essential ingredients for the offence of dowry death Under Section 304-B of IPC, wherein, father of the deceased stated that he was informed by the deceased that she was subjected to cruelty and harassment on the part of her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law in connection with dowry demand and it was further alleged that therefore she consumed poison and died. The trial court convicted the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law for the commission of offence Under Section 304-B of IPC. The High Court acquitted the father-in-law and mother-in-law but upheld the conviction and sentence passed against the husband. The appeal was preferred before Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order passed by the High Court upholding the conviction and sentence passed against the husband.

Conviction of the husband was challenged mainly on the following three grounds:

1. Basic and essential ingredients of Section 304-B of IPC are not satisfied.

2. The Trial Court applied the presumption Under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as a matter of routine.

3. A conviction Under Section 304-B of IPC cannot be sustained without any charges Under Section 498A of IPC.

It was argued on behalf of the Prosecution/State that death in the present case has occurred within four years of marriage, under suspicious circumstances. Moreover, fifteen days before the incident, the deceased had informed her father about the demand for money for the purchase of a car. Lastly, accused-husband had forged the medical records of his mother-in-law to show the cordial relationship between the two families. Therefore, the presumption Under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act operates against the accused-husband, which has not been rebutted.

Hon'ble Supreme Court, while analyzing the facts and laws on point, referred to its latest judgment in Satbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, wherein, the law Under Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act has been summarised as under: 

"i. Section 304-B of IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand.

ii. The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence Under Section 304-B of IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided Under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act operates against the accused.

iii. The phrase "soon before" as appearing in Section 304-B of IPC cannot be construed to mean 'immediately before'. The prosecution must establish existence of "proximate and live link" between the dowry death and cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives.

iv. Section 304-B of IPC does not take a pigeonhole approach in categorizing death as homicidal or suicidal or accidental. The reason for such non-categorization is due to the fact that death occurring "otherwise than under normal circumstances" can, in cases, be homicidal or suicidal or accidental."

In the present case, the death of the deceased took place within four years of her marriage due to consuming poison in her matrimonial home. Therefore, the first two ingredients as to death under otherwise than 'normal circumstances' within seven years of marriage stand satisfied. The next important ingredient which needs to be established is the existence of dowry demand "soon before her death". It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in a catena of judgments that, "soon before" cannot be interpreted to mean "immediately before", rather the prosecution has to show that there existed a "proximate and live link" between the cruelty and the consequential death of the victim [See Satbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana; Kans Raj Vs. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207; Rajinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 477]. 

The father of the deceased testified during the trial and stated that her daughter was subjected to cruelty and harassment in connection with dowry demand which was found to be reliable and consistent despite a thorough cross-examination. Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the present case, opined that the prosecution has proved the necessary ingredients Under Section 304-B of IPC against the accused-husband.

It was proved during the trial that the accused-husband, who was working as a technician in a hospital, has forged the hospital records to prove the existence of a cordial relationship between the families of the deceased and the accused.

Hon'ble Supreme Court, while concurring with the conclusion reached by the trial court, has held that "the prosecution having satisfied the necessary ingredients Under Section 304-B of IPC, the presumption Under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act takes full effect in this particular case, which has not been rebutted by the accused-appellant herein. The appellant has failed to make out a case for us to interfere in the concurrent opinions of the Courts below, convicting the accused-appellant Under Section 304-B of IPC"

Lastly, on the aspect of the third ground i.e. a conviction Under Section 304-B of IPC cannot be sustained without any charges Under Section 498A of IPC, Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to its judgment in the case of Kamlesh Panjiyar Vs. State of Bihar, (2005) 2 SCC 388, wherein, it was held that "12. It is to be noted that Sections 304-B and 498-A IPC cannot be held to be mutually inclusive. These provisions deal with two distinct offences. It is true that cruelty is a common essential to both the sections and that has to be proved. The Explanation to Section 498-A gives the meaning of "cruelty". In Section 304-B there is no such explanation about the meaning of "cruelty". But having regard to the common background to these offences it has to be taken that the meaning of "cruelty" and "harassment" is the same as prescribed in the Explanation to Section 498-A under which "cruelty" by itself amounts to an offence. Under Section 304-B it is "dowry death" that is punishable and such death should have occurred within seven years of marriage. No such period is mentioned in Section 498-A. If the case is established, there can be conviction under both the section."

Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that "20. Therefore, the argument raised by the counsel on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted as the offences Under Section 498-A and Section 304-B are distinct in nature. Although cruelty is a common thread existing in both the offences, however the ingredients of each offence are distinct and must be proved separately by the prosecution. If a case is made out, there can be a conviction under both the sections." 

Hon'ble Supreme Court has reiterated the guidelines issued in the recent judgment delivered in the matter of Satbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana relating to trial Under Section 304-B of IPC:

“v. Due to the precarious nature of Section 304- B, IPC read with 113-B, Evidence Act, Judges, prosecution and defence should be careful during conduction of trial. 

vi. It is a matter of grave concern that, often, Trial Courts record the statement under Section 313, CrPC in a very casual and cursory manner, without specifically questioning the accused as to his defense. It ought to be noted that the examination of an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality, as it based on the fundamental principle of fairness. This aforesaid provision incorporates the valuable principle of natural justice “audi alteram partem” as it enables the accused to offer an explanation for the incriminatory material appearing against him. Therefore, it imposes an obligation on the court to question the accused fairly, with care and caution. 

vii. The Court must put incriminating circumstances before the accused and seek his response. A duty is also cast on the counsel of the accused to prepare his defense since the inception of the Trial with due caution, keeping in consideration the peculiarities of Section 304-B, IPC read with Section 113-B, Evidence Act. 

viii. Section 232, CrPC provides that, “If, after taking the evidence for the prosecution, examining the accused and hearing the prosecution and the defence on the point, the Judge considers that there is no evidence that the accused committed the offence, the Judge shall record an order of acquittal”. Such discretion must be utilized by the Trial Courts as an obligation of best efforts. 

ix. Once the Trial Court decides that the accused is not eligible to be acquitted as per the provisions of Section 232, CrPC, it must move on and fix hearings specifically for ‘defence evidence’, calling upon the accused to present his defense as per the procedure provided under Section 233, CrPC, which is also an invaluable right provided to the accused. 

x. In the same breath, Trial Courts need to balance other important considerations such as the right to a speedy trial. In this regard, we may caution that the above provisions should not be allowed to be misused as delay tactics. 

xi. Apart from the above, the presiding Judge should follow the guidelines laid down by this Court while sentencing and imposing appropriate punishment. 

xii. Undoubtedly, as discussed above, the menace of dowry death is increasing day by day. However, it is also observed that sometimes family members of the husband are roped in, even though they have no active role in commission of the offence and are residing at distant places. In these cases, the Court need to be cautious in its approach.”

In the light of the above findings, after perusing the relevant material and the evidence available, the Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded that the High Court and Trial Court have not committed any error in convicting the appellant under Section 304-B, IPC as the appellant failed to discharge the burden under Section 113- B, Evidence Act. The conviction of the accused-appellant was upheld. 


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