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A Blow to Laws Against Inter-Faith Marriages in India


On 12/01/2021, Hon’ble Allahabad High Court has delivered a landmark judgment in an interesting Habeas Corpus Petition where a Muslim girl Safia Sultana after converting to Hindu religion and renamed as Simran, married to Abhishek Kumar Pandey, a Hindu boy, in accordance with Hindu rituals. Her father was not happy with this marriage and therefore he didn't allow her daughter to live with her husband. Court has directed for the presence of Safia Sultana and her father after filing of the Habeas Corpus petition, both Safia Sultana and her father appeared before the court, wherein, Safia Sultana had shown her interest and desire to live with her husband and her father also accepted the fact that she is an adult and free to make her choices.

Further, in this case, the young couple expressed that they could have solemnized their marriage under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 but the said Act requires a 30 days notice to be published and objections to be invited from the public at large. They expressed that any such notice would be an invasion in their privacy and would have definitely caused unnecessary social pressure/interference in their free choice with regard to their marriage. The personal laws do not impose any such condition of publication of notice, inviting and deciding objections before solemnizing any marriage. They further state that such a challenge is being faced by a large number of similarly situated persons who desire to build a life with a partner of their own choice. Learned counsel for petitioners also stated that the situation may become more critical with notification of Uttar Pradesh Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Ordinance, 2020, as the same prohibits conversion of religion by marriage to be unlawful. Learned counsel for petitioners further argues that looking into the changing pattern of the society, amendments made to the Special Marriage Act,1954 as well as the law declared by the Supreme Court in the last around a decade with regard to privacy, liberty and freedom of choice of a person, provisions of Special Marriage Act, 1954, directing publication of a notice before marriage and inviting public objections, require a revisit to understand whether now with the said change they are to be treated as mandatory or directory in nature.

Court has observed that, The golden rule of interpretation of statute is that so far as possible plain reading of the provisions should be accepted. Further, if any penal consequences are provided the provision would be mandatory in nature. In view of aforesaid, more specifically in view of the punitive consequences under Section 46, the publication of notice under Section 6 and inviting objections and decision thereupon under Section 7 was treated as mandatory. Thus the Marriage Officers have always published a notice of intended marriage and invited objections. Marriages under the Act of 1954 were only solemnized after a period of thirty days of notice or after decision on the objections, in case filed.

The question raised before the Court is, whether the social conditions and the law, as has progressed since passing of Act of 1872 and thereafter Act of 1954 till now, would in any manner impact the interpretation of Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Act of 1954 and whether with change the said sections no more remain mandatory in nature. This argument is based on another principle of interpretation, that, an ongoing statute should be interpreted on the basis of present day's changed conditions and not on old obsolete conditions. 

The Supreme Court considered the said principle in Satyawati Sharma Vs. Union of India and held that, It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rationale at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equity and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.

Following Satyawati Sharma in case of Kashmir Singh Vs. Union of India the Supreme Court has held that, the superior courts must remember a well-known principle of law that the Court while construing an ongoing statute must take into consideration the changes in the societal condition. It would be a relevant fact. 

For the purpose of giving an effective and meaningful construction of the provisions, the court is bound to take into consideration the situational change. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in view of the situational change, a meaning which could be attributed in the year 1925 cannot be given the same meaning today. For the aforementioned purpose, Sections 40 and 70 of the Act must be read together. Therefore a holistic reading of the entire Act would be necessary.

Lata Singh Vs. State of U.P. was one of the initial cases which came up before the Supreme Court raising the issue of the right of a person to marry of his own choice. In the said case petitioner solemnized her marriage, with her own free will, with a person of another caste. The said marriage was strongly opposed by her brothers and they also committed violence upon her and her husband. Condemning the same, Supreme Court held, that the caste system is a curse on the nation and the sooner it is destroyed the better. In fact, it is dividing the nation at a time when we have to be united to face the challenges before the nation unitedly. Hence, inter-caste marriages are in fact in the national interest as they will result in destroying the caste system. However, disturbing news are coming from several parts of the country that young men and women who undergo inter-caste marriage, are threatened with violence, or violence is actually committed on them. In our opinion, such acts of violence or threats or harassment are wholly illegal and those who commit them must be severely punished. This is a free and democratic country, and once a person becomes a major he or she can marry whosoever he/she likes. If the parents of the boy or girl do not approve of such inter-caste or inter-religious marriage the maximum they can do is that they can cut off social relations with the son or the daughter, but they cannot give threats or commit or instigate acts of violence and cannot harass the person who undergoes such inter-caste or inter-religious marriage. We, therefore, direct that the administration/police authorities throughout the country will see to it that if any boy or girl who is a major undergoes inter-caste or inter-religious marriage with a woman or man who is a major, the couple are not harassed by anyone nor subjected to threats or acts of violence, and anyone who gives such threats or harasses or commits acts of violence either himself or at his instigation, is taken to task by instituting criminal proceedings by the police against such persons and further stern action is taken against such persons as provided by law.

In the case of Shakti Vahini, it was held, that the consent of the family or the community or the clan is not necessary once the two adult individuals agree to enter into a wedlock. Their consent has to be piously given primacy. If there is offence committed by one because of some penal law, that has to be decided as per law which is called determination of criminality. Further, It has to be sublimely borne in mind that when two adults consensually choose each other as life partners, it is a manifestation of their choice which is recognized under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Such a right has the sanction of the constitutional law and once that is recognized, the said right needs to be protected and it cannot succumb to the conception of class honour or group thinking which is conceived of on some notion that remotely does not have any legitimacy.

A nine-Judge Bench in case of Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and another Vs. Union of India has held, that Right to privacy is an integral part of right to life. This is a cherished constitutional value, and it is important that human beings be allowed domains of freedom that are free of public scrutiny unless they act in an unlawful manner. Privacy is a constitutionally protected right which emerges primarily from the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Elements of privacy also arise in varying contexts from the other facets of freedom and dignity recognised and guaranteed by the fundamental rights contained in Part III.

In the case of Navtej Singh Johar and others Vs. Union of India, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held, that The idea of identity of the individual and the constitutional legitimacy behind the same is of immense significance. Therefore, in this context, the duty of the constitutional courts gets accentuated. We emphasize on the role of the constitutional courts in realizing the evolving nature of this living instrument. Through its dynamic and purposive interpretative approach, the judiciary must strive to breathe life. 

The law as declared by the Supreme Court, since the case of Lata Singh till the decision in Navtej Singh Johar has travelled a long distance defining fundamental rights of personal liberty and of privacy is a long chain of decisions growing stronger with time and firmly establishing personal liberty and privacy to be fundamental rights including within their sphere right to choose partner without interference from State, family or society.

Court in the present case, observed, that In view of the changed social circumstances and progress in laws noted and proposed by the Law Commission as well as law declared by the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court, it would be cruel and unethical to force the present generation living with its current needs and expectations to follow the customs and traditions adopted by a generation living nearly 150 years back for its social needs and circumstances, which violates fundamental rights recognized by the courts of the day. In view of law settled in Satyawati Sharma and Kashmir Singh as stated above, it is the duty of this court to revisit the interpretation of the procedure under challenge as provided in the Act of 1954.

Court further observed and held, that the interpretation of Sections 6 and 7 read with Section 46 containing the procedure of publication of notice and inviting objections to the intended marriage in Act of 1954 thus has to be such that would uphold the fundamental rights and not violate the same. In case the same on their simplistic reading are held mandatory, as per the law declared today, they would invade in the fundamental rights of liberty and privacy, including within its sphere freedom to choose for marriage without interference from state and non-state actors, of the persons concerned. Further, note should also be taken of the fact that marriages in India can be performed either under the personal laws or under the Act of 1954. In fact, even today, majority of marriages are performed under the personal laws. These marriages under personal laws are performed by a priest of the religion followed by the parties. Such marriages under any personal law do not require publication of any notice or calling for objections with regard to such a marriage. The individuals intending to marry approach the priest who performs the marriage as per the customs and rituals of the said religion. Their orally saying that they are competent to marry is regarded sufficient for solemnizing marriage under the personal laws. In case any party violates any condition of the said personal law, for example, if one of the parties conceals his/her marital status and commits second marriage; marriage is barred under any law (one of the parties is a minor and conceals age or marriage is within the degrees of the prohibited relationship etc.) the consent of any party is obtained by deceit or under pressure or any other such circumstances arises, the issues are later decided by a court of law. But, the marriage takes place without any interference from any corner, even if it is later to be declared void. However, under Sections 6 and 7 of Act of 1954 the persons intending to solemnize a marriage are required to give a notice and the Marriage Officer thereafter is made duty bound to publish the notice for a period of 30 days and invite objections with regard to the same. Any person can object to the marriage on the ground that it violates any of the condition of Section 4 of Act of 1954. None of the conditions under Section 4 of Act of 1954 is such, violation of which would impact rights of any person in any manner different than the same would in case of a marriage under any personal law. Even if a marriage takes place in violation of any of the conditions of Section 4, legal consequences would follow and the courts can decide upon the same, including declare such a marriage to be void, as they do under the personal laws. There is no apparent reasonable purpose achieved by making the procedure to be more protective or obstructive under the Act of 1954, under which much less numbers of marriages are taking place, than procedure under the other personal laws, more particularly when this discrimination violates the fundamental rights of the class of persons adopting the Act of 1954 for their marriage. However, in case, such individuals applying to solemnize their marriage under the Act of 1954 themselves by their free choice desire that they would like to have more information about their
counterparts, they can definitely opt for publication of notice under Section 6 and further procedure with regard to objections to be followed. Such publication of notice and further procedure would not be violative of their fundamental rights as they adopt the same of their free will. Therefore, the requirement of publication of notice under Section 6 and inviting/entertaining objections under Section 7 can only be read as directory in nature, to be given effect only on request of parties to the intended marriage and not otherwise.
Thus, this Court mandates that while giving notice under Section 5 of the Act of 1954 it shall be optional for the parties to the intended marriage to make a request in writing to the Marriage Officer to publish or not to publish a notice under Section 6 and follow the procedure of objections as prescribed under the Act of 1954. In case they do not make such a request for publication of notice in writing, while giving notice under Section 5 of the Act, the Marriage Officer shall not publish any such notice or entertain objections to the intended marriage and proceed with the solemnization of the marriage. It goes without saying that it shall be open for the Marriage Officer, while solemnizing any marriage under the Act of 1954, to verify the identification, age and valid consent of the parties or otherwise their competence to marry under the said Act. In case he has any doubt, it shall be open for him to ask for appropriate details/proof as per the facts of the case.


Safia Sultana Vs. State of UP(2021)
Vivek Chaudhary, Justice

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