A non-maintainable case against PM Narendra Modi

Hon’ble Supreme Court has dismissed an appeal filed against the order passed by Allahabad High Court, rejecting the election petition filed by Tej Bahadur against PM Narendra Modi, challenging his election to the 17th Lok Sabha from Varanasi parliamentary constituency, held in April - May 2019.

In the present case, it was observed, that Section 81 of The Representation of the people Act, 1951 provides that an Election Petition may be presented by (a) any elector or (b) any candidate at such election. The Explanation to Section 81 provides that an “elector” means a person who was entitled to vote at the election to which the election petition relates. In this case the election is to the Varanasi Parliamentary seat. Obviously, the appellant is not an elector registered in the Varanasi constituency since he is admittedly enrolled as an elector of Bhiwani, Mahendragarh Parliamentary Constituency, Haryana.

The term ‘candidate’ is defined in Section 79(b) of the Act. The first part of definition is intended to cover a person who has been duly nominated as a candidate. Inter-alia the second part covers a person who considers himself entitled to have been duly nominated as a candidate.

The question that arises is whether the appellant can claim to have been a duly nominated candidate at the said election. The answer must be in the negative. It is a condition for a valid nomination of a person who has been dismissed from service, that the nomination paper must be accompanied by a certificate to the effect that the person seeking nomination has not been dismissed for corruption or disloyalty to the State. Section 33(3) of the Act itself provides the consequence of the absence of such certificate and that is that such a person “shall not be deemed to be duly nominated as a candidate”. The law itself deems that such a person cannot be duly nominated. The word ‘deemed’ in this provision does not create a legal fiction. It clarifies any doubt anyone might entertain as to the legal character of a person who has not and states with definiteness that such a person shall not be deemed to be duly nominated. It would, therefore, be absurd to construe the legislative scheme as permitting a person who has not filed his nomination in accordance with Section 33(3), as enabling him to claim that he is a duly nominated candidate even though the provision mandates that such a person shall not be deemed to be a duly nominated candidate.

(Tej Bahadur vs Narendra Modi)

Source - https://main.sci.gov.in/judgments

https://www.indiacode.nic.in/handle/123456789/2096?view_type=browse&sam_handle=123456789/1362

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