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Can a mother-in-law claim protection and other reliefs, under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, against her daughter-in-law?


Under the scheme of The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 2005') an aggrieved person can avail the benefits provided under the Act of 2005 against respondant only. Aggrieved person is defined under section 2(a) as any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. This definition manifestly suggests that an aggrieved person can solely be a woman.

Further, section 2(q) defines respondent as any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under the Act of 2005. Proviso to section 2(q) further says that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner. Bare perusal of both the definitions lead us to say that : 

i) Aggrieved person can only be a woman(not only wife). 

ii) respondent can only be an adult male if aggrieved person is other than wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage. 

iii) females can also be made respondent if aggrieved person is wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage. 

Above-mentioned perusal suggests that mother-in-law or any other female, other than wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage, can not claim any protection and other reliefs provided by the Act of 2005 against daughter-in-law or any other female. But fortunately this is not the actual position of law. 

On 06/10/2016, Division Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hiral P. Harsora vs Kusum Narottamdas Harsora while dealing with this issue deleted the term "adult male" from the definition of respondent and held that, the microscopic difference between male and female, adult and non-adult, regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the Act of 2005, is neither real or substantial nor does it have any rational relation to the object of the legislation. In fact, as per the principle settled in the Subramanian Swamy vs CBI judgement, the words "adult male person" are contrary to the object of affording protection to women who have suffered from domestic violence "of any kind". We, therefore, strike down the words "adult male" before the word "person" in Section 2(q), as these words discriminate between persons situate, and far from being in tune with, are contrary to the object sought to be achieved by the Act of 2005. 

Further, the definition of "respondent" in Section 2(q) is not based on any intelligible differentia having any rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act of 2005. The restriction of such person to being an adult male alone is obviously not a differentia which would be in sync with the object sought to be achieved under the Act of 2005, but would in fact be contrary to it and hence, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 

The answer of the question shall be in affirmative since with the effect of the above-discussed judgment(Hiral P. Harsora vs Kusum Narottamdas Harsora), definition of respondent includes daughter-in-law too. 

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